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I. Introduction
This casenote will examine the two Second Circuit opinions
in United States v. Adiman.1 The first issue discussed is the
court's holding in AdIman I that a document prepared by an
accountant at the request of in-house counsel, to determine the
tax ramifications of corporate restructuring, is not a protected
communication under the attorney-client privilege. This case-
note will explore the validity of the accountant-client privilege,
1. 68 F.3d 1495 (2d Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Adlman I]; No. 96-6095, 1998 U.S.
App. LEXIS 2633 (2d Cir. Feb. 13, 1998) [hereinafter AdIman Ill.
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the use of the attorney-client privilege to an accountant as an
agent of the attorney, as well as the standard for the application
of the attorney-client privilege to in-house corporate counsel.
Second, this casenote will examine the Second Circuit's decision
in Adlman I, which held that a document prepared before the
event that led to litigation could be found to have been prepared
in anticipation of litigation.2 In so holding, the court rejected
the district court's formulation of a new test for applying work
product protection to documents. 3 This casenote will also dis-
cuss Adlman's appearance before the Second Circuit in the
Adlman 11, where the court was required to interpret "in antici-
pation of litigation" for the first time.4
Section II will explain the attorney-client privilege and
work product doctrine as each evolved prior to the Adlman deci-
sions. Section III will discuss both Second Circuit opinions ren-
dered in Adlman. Section IV will address the effects of Adlman
I decision on the attorney-client privilege, especially as it per-
tains to in-house corporate counsel and agents of an attorney.
It will also consider both of the Adlman decisions' effects upon
the work product doctrine. Section V will summarize the impor-
tant aspects and effects of the Adlman decision.
II. Background
A. Attorney-Client Privilege
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest privilege known
in the common-law. 5 Dating as far back as the 1600s, 6 the at-
torney-client privilege was in existence during the reign of Eliz-
abeth I as an extension of the right of individuals to avoid self-
incrimination following the adoption of testimonial compulsion
in England.7 The privilege was created to prevent the attorney
from having to testify, under oath, against his client, because
such testimony would violate the attorney's honor as a gen-
2. See Adiman I, 68 F.3d at 1501.
3. See id.
4. See AdIman H, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 2633, at *9.
5. See United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989).
6. See United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292 (2d Cir. 1991).
7. See Bilzerian, 926 F.2d at 1292; 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290, 542-44
(McNaughton rev. 1961).
19981
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tleman.8 Under the original scheme, the privilege belonged to
the attorney.9 Today, the privilege is recognized as the cli-
ent's. 10 The client, then, determines whether a communication
made to his or her attorney may be disclosed by the attorney,
and has the authority to raise or waive the privilege.'1 The at-
torney may also raise the privilege on the client's behalf.12
To invoke the attorney-client privilege, the existence of the
attorney-client relationship is not enough; the privilege must
also be explicitly raised and claimed in connection with a partic-
ular communication.' 3 The privilege must also be invoked
before any disclosure of the communication sought to be pro-
tected has occurred, otherwise the privilege is waived.' 4 Sev-
eral tests have been articulated to determine whether the
attorney-client privilege applies in a given situation. 5 In es-
8. See EDNA SELAN EPSTEIN, Section of Litigation, American Bar Association,
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE at 2 (3d ed.
1997) [hereinafter EPSTEIN]; WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2290 at 542-43.
9. See WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2290, at 542-44.
10. See Bilzerian, 926 F.2d at 1292; WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2290, at 542-44.
11. See EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 2.
12. See In the Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 391 F.Supp.
1029, 1034 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (allowing attorney to raise the attorney-client privilege
even though the client was outside the country and could not assert it directly on
his own behalf).
13. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D.
Mass. 1950); Shiner v. American Stock Exch., 28 F.R.D. 34, 35 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
(holding that the attempt to assert the attorney-client privilege before any specific
questions were asked of the witness was premature; the privilege should be as-
serted only after specific questions were asked of the witness).
14. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 25. In general, if a client com-
municates a matter to his or her attorney in the presence of a third person who is
not an agent of the attorney, the communication is not confidential and is not pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege because the nature of the communication
indicates that the client did not intend for the communication to be confidential.
See id. at 46.
15. See United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989). See
also United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961) (citing 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2292, 554 (McNaughton rev. 1961)); United States v. Bein, 728 F.2d
107, 112 (2d Cir. 1984). Each case utilized the elements established by Wigmore:
"(1) where legal advice of any kind is sought; (2) from a professional legal adviser
in his capacity as such; (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made
in confidence; (5) by the client; (6) are at his instance permanently protected; (7)
from disclosure by himself or the legal adviser; (8) except the protection be
waived." Id.; See also United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp. , 89 F.Supp. 357,
358-59 (D. Mass. 1950) which used a third test as follows: "the privilege applies
only if (1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the
person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court,
422
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sence, each test requires satisfaction of those elements articu-
lated in United States v. Schwimmer.16 The test enunciated in
Schwimmer requires: (1) the attorney-client relationship; (2)
communications made by the client relating to subject matter
upon which professional advice is sought; and (3) confidential-
ity of the communication for which the protection is claimed. 17
The party asserting the privilege has the burden of proving that
each element of the privilege applies.' 8
The attorney-client privilege also extends to certain agents
of the attorney.' 9 The need for extending the privilege beyond
the attorney arose as a result of the complexity of litigation.20
For example, an attorney often requires the assistance of secre-
taries, paralegals, investigators, and summer associates in or-
der to effectively handle his or her case.21 In certain contexts,
however, it is difficult to discern whether the attorney-client
privilege applies to an agent of the attorney.22 This problem
often arises in cases involving corporations that may require
the help of an accountant in preparing the corporation's income
taxes.23 In order to obtain an accountant's assistance, the cor-
poration must reveal information about its financial situation.24
The question thus raised is whether the communication to the
or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting as a
lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed
(a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purposes of secur-
ing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in
some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort;
and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client." Id.
16. 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989).
17. See id.
18. See von Bulow by Auersperg v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1015 (1987); Schwimmer, 892 F.2d at 244.
19. See Schwimmer, 892 F.2d at 243.
20. See EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 109.
21. See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961) (quoting WIG-
MORE, supra note 7, § 2301, at 583) ("[tlhe assistance of these agents being indis-
pensable to his work and the communications of the client being often necessarily
committed to them by the attorney or by the client himself, the privilege must
include all the persons who act as the attorney's agents").
22. See EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 106-09.
23. See Ronald E. Friedman and Dan L. Mendelson, The Need for CPA-Client
Priviledge in Federal Tax Matters, 1996 TAx ADviSER 154, 155.
24. See generally id.; United States v. Arthur Young and Co., 465 U.S. 805,
812 (1984) (discussing sources auditor must review in order to evaluate the ade-
quacy and reasonableness of the corporation's reserve account for contingent tax
liabilities).
1998] 423
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accountant is privileged. 25 This was one of the issues addressed
by the Adlman I decision.26
1. Policy Justifications Underlying the Attorney-Client
Privilege
There are four major premises underlying the attorney-cli-
ent privilege. First, legal matters can only be effectively han-
dled if all available and relevant facts are disclosed to the
attorney.27 In Upjohn v. United States,2 the United States
Supreme Court stated that the attorney-client privilege is nec-
essary to "encourage full and frank communication between at-
torneys and their clients," 29 thereby serving as the basis for
providing sound legal advice to the client. 30 Second, the attor-
ney-client privilege helps calm the fear of potential clients that
their communications with the attorney may be disclosed to a
third party, keeping the potential client from seeking legal ad-
vice from an attorney.31 Third, the attorney-client privilege en-
courages compliance with regulatory laws because the attorney
is in the best position to advise clients regarding the law and
urge them to follow it,32 thereby "facilitat[ing] the administra-
tion of justice."33 Finally, the attorney-client privilege may also
discourage frivolous lawsuits in cases where an attorney finds,
after full disclosure, that his client's case is too weak to
pursue. 34
25. See generally Friedman and Mendelson, supra note 23, at 154-56.
26. See infra notes 302-319 and accompanying text.
27. See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); United States v.
Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237, 243 (2d Cir. 1989); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S.
40, 51 (1980) (pointing out the importance of full disclosure).
28. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
29. Id. at 389.
30. See id.
31. See Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (stating that legal
"assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free from the conse-
quences or the apprehension of disclosure"); United States v. Grand Jury Investi-
gation, 401 F.Supp. 361, 369 (W.D. Pa. 1975) ("at the base of the attorney-client
privilege lies the policy that one who seeks advice or aid from a lawyer should be
completely free of any fear that his secrets will be uncovered").
32. See EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 4; Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 691 (10th
Cir. 1968).
33. Natta, 392 F.2d at 691.
34. See James A. Gardner, A Re-Evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege
(Part 1), 8 VILL. L. REV. 279, 303-309 (1963) (stating necessity of lawyer interpret-
424 [Vol. 18:419
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In conflict with the attorney-client privilege is the liberal
policy underlying the discovery rules of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 35 The conflict between these theories is height-
ened in the corporate context, because of fear that a broadly
construed attorney-client privilege will surround corporate af-
fairs resulting in a zone of silence. 36 In order to fashion a rule
for the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context, the ju-
diciary has worked to balance these competing interests.37
2. Attorney-Client Privilege In the Corporate Context
The attorney-client privilege is not just restricted to indi-
viduals; it may also be asserted by a corporation. 38 In Upjohn v.
United States,39 the Supreme Court faced the question of which
employees of a corporation were entitled to assert the attorney-
client privilege on behalf of the corporation.40 The Upjohn Court
refused to "draft a set of rules"41 for all situations to which the
attorney-client privilege applies in the corporate context, hold-
ing that the presence of the attorney-client privilege should be
determined on a case-by-case basis.42 However, Chief Justice
Burger, in his concurring opinion, developed a standard to pro-
ing facts as they are relayed by the client in order to determine what actually
happened).
35. See FED. R. Civ. PRo. 26-37. See also Jacqueline A. Weiss, Beyond Upjohn:
Achieving Certainty By Expanding the Scope of the Corporate Attorney-Client Priv-
ilege, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 1182, 1202-1205 (1982).
36. See, e.g., Jarvis, Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 84 F.R.D. 286, 291-92 (D.
Colo. 1979); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 387 (D.D.C. 1978).
37. See Weiss, supra note 35, at 1202 and n. 120.
38. See United States v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 236 U.S. 318, 336
(1915); Radiant Burners v. American Gas Ass'n., 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir. 1963).
39. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
40. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386. The Supreme Court addressed two tests that
evolved in the federal courts for determining to which employees the attorney-cli-
ent privilege applied in the corporate context. See id. The first test is the "control
group" test. See id. at 390. The control group consisted of those in a position to
control or take substantial part in a decision about the corporation that may re-
quire the advice of an attorney. See id. The Supreme Court rejected this test. See
id. at 397. The second test is the "subject matter" test. See EPSTEIN, supra note 8,
at 74-81. The elements of this test, before Upjohn, were that: (1) the person mak-
ing the communication to the attorney must have been employed by the corpora-
tion; (2) the communication must have been made at the direction of a corporate
superior; and, (3) the communication must have been within the scope of the em-
ployee's duties. See EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 79.
41. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 396.
42. See id. at 396-97.
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vide guidance for the attorney-client privilege in the corporate
setting, stating that:
as a general rule, a communication is privileged when.., an em-
ployee or former employee speaks at the direction of the manage-
ment with an attorney regarding conduct or proposed conduct
within the scope of employment. The attorney must be one au-
thorized by the management to inquire into the subject and must
be seeking information to assist counsel in performing any of the
following functions: (a) evaluating whether the employee's con-
duct has bound or would bind the corporation; (b) assessing the
legal consequences, if any, of that conduct; or (c) formulating ap-
propriate legal responses to actions that have been or may be
taken by others with regard to that conduct.43
This case-by-case test is also used to determine whether the at-
torney-client privilege will apply to an agent of the attorney."
a. Accountants
The attorney-client privilege may extend to an attorney's
agent, such as an accountant, where the assistance of the ac-
countant is necessary for effective client representation.45 For
example, in United States v. Kovel,46 the defendant was an ac-
countant working for a tax law firm. 47 Upon subpoena by the
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") to testify regarding alleged
federal income tax violations by a client of the law firm, the de-
fendant refused to answer several questions on the ground that
the information was protected by the attorney-client privilege. 48
The Second Circuit balanced two competing views to decide
whether the attorney-client privilege extended to a communica-
tion between a nonlawyer and the lawyer's client.49 According
to the first view, these privileges protecting communications
should be restricted, not expanded, to aid the "investigation of
truth and the enforcement of testimonial duty."50 The court
43. Id. at 402-403 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
44. See generally United States v. Schwimmer, 892 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1989).
45. See, e.g., Schwimmer, 892 F.2d at 243; United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d
918, 921-23 (2d Cir. 1961).
46. 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961).
47. See Kovel, 296 F.2d at 919.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 920-21.
50. Id. at 921 (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2192, at 73).
[Vol. 18:419426
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noted that all communications to nonlawyers should not be pro-
tected simply by putting the nonlawyers on the law firm payroll
and keeping them in the law offices. 51 On the other hand, the
court recognized that the complexity of litigation prevents an
attorney from effectively handling a client's case without the
help of nonlawyers. 52 Ultimately, the court held that because
lawyers must use nonlawyers, and because the client or attor-
ney must often reveal privileged communications to nonlawy-
ers, the privilege must extend to all persons who act as the
attorney's agent.53
The Kovel court stated that the presence of an accountant
as the attorney's agent should not destroy the attorney-client
privilege.M The court expanded the scope of the attorney's
agent to include an accountant by analogizing this situation to
that of an interpreter called in to assist the attorney in render-
ing legal advice to his client.55 In the case of an interpreter, the
court suggested four scenarios where the elements of the attor-
ney-client privilege were fulfilled: (1) the attorney sends a for-
eign speaking client to an interpreter to have a literal
translation of the client's story produced; (2) the attorney has a
more knowledgeable nonlawyer employee in the room to help
because the attorney himself understands little of the foreign
language; (3) same as (2) except the client brings the interpreter
along instead of the attorney summoning an employee for help;
and (4) the attorney sends the client to a nonlawyer proficient in
the language to interview the client on the attorney's behalf and
render his own summary of the situation, with the nonlawyer
drawing on his own knowledge of the process, so the attorney
can give the client sound legal advice. 56 According to the court,
the fact that the communication was made in order to obtain
legal advice from the lawyer was vital to the attorney-client
51. See Kovel, 296 F.2d at 921.
52. See id.
53. See id. (citing WIGMORE, supra note 7, § 2301, at 583).
54. See Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922.
55. See id. at 921. Interpreters have long been recognized as agents of the
attorney whose presence during a conversation between attorney and client does
not destroy the attorney-client privilege, and whose services are necessary to
render sound legal advice. See id. See, e.g., Maas v. Block, 7 Ind. 202 (1855).
56. See Kovel, 296 F.2d at 921-22.
42719981
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privilege.5 7 Thus, the privilege would not exist if the client was
seeking accounting services, or if the advice sought was the ac-
countant's and not the lawyer's.58
i. Accountant-Client Privilege
There is no general accountant-client privilege.5 9 This prin-
ciple was established by the Supreme Court in Couch v. United
States,60 and reaffirmed in United States v. Arthur Young and
Co.6 1 In Young, a firm of certified public accountants, acting as
independent auditors of a corporation, refused to turn over the
corporation's tax accrual workpapers62 upon the demand of the
IRS.63 The Second Circuit64 determined that a privilege should
apply and fashioned an accountant work-product privilege. 65
The court found there was a public interest in ensuring the in-
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973).
60. 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973).
61. 465 U.S. 805, 817 (1984).
62. See Young, 465 U.S. at 812-13. Tax accrual workpapers are documents
and memoranda relating to the accountant's evaluation of the company's reserves
for contingent tax liabilities. See id. at 813. The reserves form an account called
the tax accrual account, the noncurrent tax account, or the tax pool. See id. at 812.
The accrual account represents the amount set aside by the corporation to cover
adjustments and additions to the corporation's actual tax liability. See id. The
accountant makes a determination of whether this account is sufficient by con-
ducting an analysis of the corporation's books, records, and tax returns, in light of
relevant Code provisions, Treasury Regulations, Revenue Rulings, and case law.
See id. The auditor will also assess the opinions of management with regard to
unclear, aggressive, or questionable tax positions that may have been taken on
prior tax returns. See Young, 465 U.S. at 812-13. The auditor often uses a worse
case scenario analysis to ensure that the corporation's exposure to additional lia-
bility is fully covered by the tax accrual account. See id. The tax accrual
workpapers record this information. See id. at 813. These papers will contain, for
example, an item-by-item analysis of the corporation's potential exposure to addi-
tional liability. See id. These papers pinpoint the weaknesses of a corporation's
tax return by highlighting those areas where the corporate taxpayer has taken a
position that may require payment of additional taxes. See id.
63. See Young, 465 U.S. at 808-809. The IRS can issue an administrative
summons under 26 U.S.C. § 7602 (1992). This statute provides the IRS with broad
information-gathering authority. See Young, 465 U.S. at 816.
64. See Arthur Young and Co v. United States, 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982).
65. See id. at 219-21 (stating, "a work product privilege, similar to the privi-
lege fashioned in Hickman, seems to us appropriate").
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol18/iss2/5
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tegrity of the securities market, and this public interest was
served by promoting full disclosure to public accountants. 66
The Supreme Court stated that the underlying policy be-
hind the Second Circuit's decision was to fashion a more expan-
sive work-product remedy in the form of accountant-client
privilege.6 7 The Court reasoned that there already existed a
procedural safeguard to prevent corporations from withholding
information to auditors for fear that such information would be
accessible to the IRS.68 The auditor has a duty to determine the
sufficiency of the tax accrual reserves, based on whether the
corporation has adequately provided for its contingent tax lia-
bilities.69 If the auditor thought a corporation was withholding
information, the auditor could not give an unqualified opinion
as to the accuracy of the corporation's financial statements. 70
This requires the accountant to give a qualified opinion indicat-
ing potential problems in the corporation's financial records to
the investing market. 71 Since no corporate officer would risk re-
ceiving a qualified opinion, the integrity of the securities mar-
ket is protected. 72
Other reasons exist for disallowing an accountant-client
privilege. One is the evidentiary principle that disfavors privi-
leges, since privileges prevent the use of highly relevant evi-
dence. 73 According to this rationale, testimonial privileges are
only tolerable when they are "within the narrowest limits re-
quired by principle."7 4 According to Wigmore, "[tihere must be
good reason, plainly shown, for their existence."75 Second, the
differing roles of an attorney and an accountant serve as a basis
for declining the application of an accountant-client privilege. 76
An attorney's role is that of a confidential advisor with a duty of
undivided loyalty to her client.77 The attorney-client privilege
66. See id. at 219.
67. See Young, 465 U.S. at 817.
68. See id. at 818.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See Young, 465 U.S. at 819.
73. See WIGMORE, supra note 7, 2192, at 73.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See Young, 465 U.S. at 817-18.
77. See id. at 817.
1998] 429
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aids the attorney in this role because it gives the client the as-
surance that the attorney will not repeat information relayed to
her by the client.78 It also encourages full disclosure from client
to attorney, which is necessary for adequate representation. 79
An accountant, on the other hand, owes a duty of loyalty to the
client, government agencies regulating the client's industry, the
client's creditors, and the client's investors.80 In Couch, the
Court held that the accountant-client relationship was not of
such a confidential nature as to create an expectation of privacy
necessitating the protection of communications to an account-
ant under an accountant-client privilege. 81 The Court stated
"there can be little expectation of privacy where records are
handed to an accountant, knowing that mandatory disclosure of
much of the information therein is required in an income tax
return."8 2 Further, since an accountant can be criminally prose-
cuted for preparing a false return, he or she is highly en-
couraged to disclose any information given to him or her by the
client.8 3 This precludes a client from claiming he or she had an
expectation of privacy or confidentiality.8 4 Finally, unlike an at-
torney, the role of an accountant is to give information to the
public about the client's financial statements and not to act as a
confidential adviser to the client.8 5
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's holding in Couch,
the argument favoring the imposition of an accountant-client
privilege is still being raised.8 6 One argument in support of the
privilege is that it conserves resources, for in order to protect
tax-related communications to their accountants, the taxpayer
must seek outside counsel.8 7 This can be duplicative, time con-
suming, and expensive, especially for smaller businesses and
smaller taxpayers.88 Second, the privilege reduces the client's
78. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text
80. See Young, 465 U.S. at 817-18.
81. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973).
82. Id.
83. See id. at 335.
84. See id. at 335-36.
85. See Young, 465 U.S. at 817-18.
86. See Ronald E. Friedman and Dan L. Mendelson, The Need for CPA-Client
Priviledge in Federal Tax Matters, 1996 TAx ADVISER 154, 155.
87. See id. at 156.
88. See id.
430 [Vol. 18:419
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choice of adviser, because if the client wants the communication
to be privileged, he or she must choose a lawyer for advice in-
stead of, or in addition to, an accountant.8 9 Third, several states
have recognized some form of an accountant-client privilege.90
However, even when a state recognizes such a privilege, it is not
applicable in the federal courts.91 Fourth, it has been argued
that because accountants are treated the same as attorneys
when they represent clients before the IRS, the information
communicated to them by their clients should be privileged in
the federal courts as well.92
The scope of the attorney-client privilege as applied to
nonlawyers has also been found to exclude conversations be-
tween an accountant and client held outside the presence of the
client's attorney, even though the subject matter of the conver-
sation was the potential legal liability of the client. 93 Nonethe-
less, presence of the attorney when the conversation takes place
is not always required, as evidenced by United States v.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 155.
91. See, e.g., Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir. 1962) ("ques-
tions of privilege in a federal income tax investigation are matters of federal law");
In re International Horizons, 689 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1982); In re Kroh, 80
Bankr. 488, 489 (W.D. Mo. 1987).
92. See Ronald E. Friedman and Dan L. Mendelson, The Need for CPA-Client
Priviledge in Federal Tax Matters, 1996 TAX ADVISER 154, 156.
93. See United States v. Bein, 728 F.2d 107, 112-13 (2d Cir. 1984). In Bein, a
company was selling deferred delivery gold and silver contracts. See id. at 109.
Prior to establishing the company, the two men who formed the company met with
two lawyers and an accountant to determine the legality of the business. See id. at
110. During the meeting, the lawyers referred to a case which held that deferred
delivery gold and silver option contracts were illegal option contracts. See id. The
accountant read the case after the meeting and told one of the men considering
forming the company that his company could not sell option contracts. See id. The
Second Circuit upheld the admittance of this conversation at trial, reasoning that
the conversation did not meet the test for the existence of the attorney-client privi-
lege. See Bein, 728 F.2d at 112. This was true since the conversation occurred
after the meetings with counsel and after legal advice had been obtained. See id.
at 112-13. Further, the accountant was functioning as an accountant, not as a
professional legal advisor. See id. at 113. Also, the accountant's view of the propri-
ety of the business, whether or not it was based upon the accountant's view of the
law, was not covered by the attorney-client privilege. See id. Finally, the account-
ant's presence at the legal meeting may have facilitated the defendant's under-
standing that he was receiving technical legal advice, but performing that function
does not cloak the accountant with the expertise, ethical obligations, or profes-
sional rights of one admitted to the bar. See id.
13
PACE LAW REVIEW
Schwimmer.94 In Schwimmer, the court held that the attorney-
client privilege applied to communications between the defend-
ant and an accountant because the defendant was directed by
his attorney to speak freely with the accountant. 95 The court
stated that the key factor in applying the attorney-client privi-
lege to an attorney's agents is that the communication must be
made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal advice
from the lawyer.96 This means that information provided to an
accountant by a client at the direction of his lawyer for interpre-
tation and analysis is privileged to the extent of its connection
with the legal representation. 97
b. In-House Counsel
The attorney-client privilege applies to in-house counsel.98
However, the extent of the privilege extends remains unclear. 99
As previously noted, communications made to an attorney seek-
ing advice other than legal advice are not privileged.10 0 This be-
comes an issue in the corporate context where the in-house
attorney performs some services not exclusively related to legal
advice. 1 1 Where a corporate decision is based on both business
and legal decisions, the business decisions are not protected
solely because legal considerations are also involved. 10 2 In one
such situation, the court held that advice rendered by in-house
counsel, with responsibilities other than rendering legal advice,
is only protected if there is a clear showing that the in-house
94. 892 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1989).
95. See Schwimmer, 892 F.2d at 244.
96. See id. at 243.
97. See id.
98. See Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686, 692 (10th Cir. 1968).
99. See Laura G. Ferguson, Protecting the Confidentiality of Communications
with Corporate Tax Counsel: Drawing the Line Between Legal and Business Ad-
vice, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, July 1996, at 47.
100. See United States v. IBM, 66 F.R.D. 206, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding
that legal advice given may not be privileged if it is incidental to the business
advice); Hardy v. New York News, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 643-44 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(finding that business aspects of corporate decisions were not protected solely be-
cause legal considerations were also involved).
101. See Ferguson, supra note 99 at 47; See also, Jaret Seiberg, Docket: Attor-
ney-Client Privilege Ruling Merits Heads-Up Series, AM. BANKER, May 15, 1996, at
3.
102. See Hardy, 114 F.R.D. at 643-44.
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attorney gave the advice in a professional legal capacity.103 Ex-
amples of advice considered business advice, not legal advice,
include income tax preparation and accounting services.104 At
least one jurisdiction has been unwilling to distinguish between
legal or business services provided by a lawyer in the context of
tax returns.'0 5 Under the ambit of Kovel, however, advice given
to counsel by an expert in order to assist him in giving legal
advice to a client is protected by the attorney-client privilege. 06
Based on the wide array of precedent following Kovel, it was
unclear how the attorney-client privilege extended to in-house
counsel.' 0 7 The Adiman decision addresses this issue and helps
to establish guidelines for an in-house attorney. 08
B. Work Product
The work product doctrine evolved out of the same basic
principle underlying the attorney-client privilege: an attorney
cannot render full and adequate representation unless certain
information is kept out of the reach of adversaries.10 9 However,
the work product doctrine encourages careful and thorough
preparation by the attorney, whereas the attorney-client privi-
lege focuses on encouraging the client to fully disclose all infor-
mation to his or her attorney. 10 In addition, unlike the
attorney-client privilege, which is absolute,"' the work-product
103. See In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
104. See, e.g., In re Witness Before the Grand Jury, 631 F. Supp. 32, 33 (E.D.
Wis. 1985).
105. See Burlington Industries v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 39 (D. Md. 1974)
(holding that the attorney-client privilege was not lost in a patent case because the
communication contained technical data not directly related to rendering legal
advice).
106. See supra notes 44-57 and accompanying text; United States v. Kovel,
296 F.2d 918, 921-23 (2d Cir. 1961) (finding that the fourth analogy, comparing
accountants to interpreters, would apply); supra note 53 and accompanying text.
107. See generally Ferguson, supra note 99, at 47; Seiberg, supra note 101 at
3.
108. See infra notes 320-340.
109. See EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 99.
110. See EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 99.
111. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text; EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at
287-89.
1998]
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privilege is qualified. 112 The work product doctrine was intro-
duced in the landmark case of Hickman v. Taylor."13
1. Hickman v. Taylor"14
In Hickman, a tugboat sank in the Delaware River, killing
five crew members." 5 The tugboat owners hired a law firm to
defend them against potential suits by representatives of the
deceased crew members." 6 Shortly after the accident, the at-
torney assigned to represent the respondent tug owners inter-
viewed the survivors of the accident." 7 The attorney obtained
signed statements from them with an eye toward the antici-
pated litigation."" The petitioners, representatives of one of the
decedents, sought to elicit these statements from the attor-
ney. 1 9 The attorney refused to turn over the documents on the
ground that they contained information obtained in preparation
of litigation.120
The Supreme Court held that although the discovery rules
are to be interpreted broadly and liberally, public policy re-
quires written statements, private memoranda, and personal
recollections prepared or formed by an adverse party's counsel
in the course of his legal duties, to be free from discovery.' 2'
Moreover, a lawyer should be able to "prepare his legal theories
and plan his strategy without undue and needless interfer-
ence."'1 22 If discovery of such information upon demand by op-
posing counsel was allowed, it would cause a lawyer to leave
unwritten what he now writes down for fear of having to turn it
over to opposing counsel. 23 The Court feared that demoraliza-
112. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512 (1947); United States v. Jor-
dan, 591 F.2d 753, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The qualified privilege depends on the
information being sought and the adversary's need for the information. See id.;
EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 287-89.
113. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
114. Id.
115. See id. at 498.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 498-99.
120. See id. at 499.
121. See id. at 510.
122. Id. at 511.
123. See id.
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tion of the legal profession would eventually result if attorneys
were permitted to borrow the wits of their adversaries. 124
The work product doctrine does not protect every statement
obtained or prepared by counsel with an eye toward litiga-
tion. 125 Rather, the protection can be overcome if the party
seeking discovery can show sufficient need. 26 The Hickman
court also stated that the attorney's thoughts, mental impres-
sions, and theories were at the heart of the adversary system,
and therefore deserve the highest protection. 27 This concept is
now referred to as "opinion work product," which receives al-
most absolute protection.' 28 Work-product not containing the
attorney's mental processes is referred to as "ordinary work
product," and is subject to a lower threshold of discoverability
upon a showing of need and hardship. 29
124. See Hickman, 392 U.S. at 511.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 511-12.
127. See id. at 512-13.
128. See EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 291.
129. See EPSTEIN, supra note 8, at 291. See also, National Union Fire Ins. v.
Murray Sheet Metal, 967 F.2d 980, 984-85 (4th Cir. 1992).
19981 435
17
PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 18:419
2. Codification of the Work-Product Doctrine: Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)130
The principles of Hickman were, for the most part,13' codi-
fied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3).1 32 The elements
required under Rule 26(b)(3) include: (1) documents and tangi-
ble things otherwise discoverable; (2) prepared in anticipation
of litigation or for trial; and (3) by or for another party or by or
for that other party's representative.133 Work-product protec-
tion does not extend to facts contained in documents which may
be discovered through depositions or interrogatories, but only
reaches formulations of the facts and thoughts concerning infor-
mation recorded by the attorney in preparation for litigation. 34
In order to overcome the qualified immunity, the party seeking
discovery must establish a substantial need for the materials
and the inability to obtain the substantial equivalent without
undue hardship. 35 Even upon such a showing, the court must
still protect against disclosure of the attorney's mental
processes from his or her adversary. 36
130. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3), which provides in pertinent part:
"[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in
anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that
other party's representative (including the other party's attorney,
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that
the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the
preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable without undue
hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other
means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required showing
has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental
impressions, conclusions, opinion, or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party concerning the litigation."
Id.
131. See EPSTEIN, supra note 8 at 293 (stating that Federal Rule 26(b)(3) does
not provide the same protection as found in Hickman because it is limited to pre-
trial discovery; it protects materials prepared by a party's representative other
than the party's attorney; and finally, it only addresses the discovery of documents
and tangible things).
132. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) Advisory Committee's notes; EPSTEIN, supra
note 8, at 293.
133. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(b)(3); United States v. Jordan, 591 F.2d 753, 774
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
134. See National Union, 967 F.2d at 984 n.5.
135. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
136. See id.
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3. Anticipation of Litigation Requirement
In the corporate context, documents are created for a vari-
ety of reasons, including preparing for litigation; improving the
company's product,137 increasing the safety of the workplace, 138
and adhering to a statutory requirement. 39 When a corpora-
tion becomes involved in a lawsuit, such documents may be
sought by the corporation's adversary. 40 If the corporation
claims that the documents are protected by the work product
doctrine, it must support its claim by establishing that the doc-
uments in issue were created in anticipation of litigation.'
4
'
Overall, courts do not require that a pending lawsuit sat-
isfy the anticipation of litigation requirement. 142 This concept,
however, is limited to preclude too much protection for docu-
ments based on any remote possibility of litigation in the fu-
ture. 43 To accommodate these competing interests, courts have
articulated three major tests to provide a fair amount of protec-
tion.' 4" The first test is the "specific claim requirement," which
focuses on how concrete a potential claim is at the time the doc-
137. See Soeder v. General Dynamics Corp., 90 F.R.D. 253, 255 (D. Nev.
1980). The court held an in-house investigation of an airplane accident was not
protected by work product doctrine because it was motivated by the desire to im-
prove the product, guard against adverse publicity, protect the company's eco-
nomic interests, and prepare for litigation. See id.
138. See National Union, 967 F.2d at 985. Following a fire in a plastics plant,
an in-house investigation of the circumstances surrounding the fire was conducted
by those charged with safety responsibilities. See id. The court remanded for con-
sideration of whether the documents were created in anticipation of litigation. See
id.
139. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 542-44 (5th Cir. 1982).
Tax-pool analyses prepared in compliance with public reporting requirements
were not discoverable because the primary motivation in creating them was to
comply with the reporting requirements, not to prepare for possible litigation over
tax returns filed by the company. See id.
140. See, e.g., National Union, 967 F.2d at 984; SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corpora-
tion, 70 F.R.D. 508, 512 (D. Conn. 1976).
141. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
142. See Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 42 (D. Md. 1974)
(finding that it is not necessary that documents be prepared after litigation has
commenced; rather material prepared when litigation is merely a contingency can
be protected); Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386-87, 397-402 (Supreme Court applying work
product doctrine even though there were no proceedings against the company
when the documents were prepared).
143. See, e.g., SCM Corporation v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 515 (D. Conn.
1976).
144. See infra pages 29-35.
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uments are prepared. 145 The second is the "function of the docu-
ments" test, which focuses on how the documents are actually
going to be used by the preparer. 146 The third is the "primary
motivation" standard, which looks to the real reason behind the
creation of the documents. 47 When analyzing a work product
claim, the document in issue will generally be either a business
document or an investigative document. 148
a. Business Documents
Under the work-product doctrine, a document prepared in
the ordinary course of business is not considered to have been
prepared in anticipation of litigation, and is therefore not given
work-product protection. 49 Thus, a report which is regularly
created for bookkeeping, accounting, personal, or other pur-
poses is considered to be prepared in the ordinary course of
business, even if it may be useful in preparing for litigation. 150
Similarly, opinion letters, written by a company's attorneys re-
lating to whether the sale of shares without SEC registration
could result in liability, were held to have been prepared as a
matter of routine procedure and not in anticipation of litiga-
tion.' 5 ' The ordinary course of business limitation also includes
documents prepared pursuant to a statutory or regulatory
duty. 52
145. See infra notes 179-192 and accompanying text.
146. See infra notes 191-203 and accompanying text.
147. See infra notes 204-215 and accompanying text.
148. See generally Sherman L. Cohn, The Work-Product Doctrine: Protection,
Not Privilege, 71 GEo. L. J. 917, 925-29 (1983).
149. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's notes on alterations to
the Rule made in 1976: "[m] aterials assembled in the ordinary course of business,
or made pursuant to public requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other non-
litigation purposes are not under the qualified immunity provided by this subdivi-
sion." Id.; See Martin v. Valley Nat'l Bank of Arizona, 140 F.R.D. 291, 304
(S.D.N.Y. 1991). The work product rule only applies to documents prepared pri-
marily to assist anticipated or ongoing litigation, therefore, if a party creates a
document in the ordinary course of business, it is not protected by work product,
even if the party realizes that the document might also be useful in the event of
litigation. See id.; FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee's notes.
150. See Cohn, supra note 148, at 928, n.93.
151. See Garfinkle v. Arcata, 64 F.R.D. 688, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
152. See United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530, 543 (5th Cir. 1982); Abel
Inv. Co. v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 485, 489 (D. Neb. 1971).
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Some documents fall outside the purview of ordinary busi-
ness documents, and into the realm of the investigative docu-
ment.153 For example, following an accident, a corporation may
investigate, inter alia, the cause of the accident, ways to pre-
vent another accident in the future, and potential liability. 54 In
the course of its investigation, the corporation may prepare doc-
uments detailing this information.' 55 Since accidents are not an
everyday occurrence, these documents will probably not be con-
sidered to have been created in the ordinary course of
business. 56
b. Investigative Documents
Investigative documents are created following an accident
or event.' 57 Since the 1970 amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, three major lines of reasoning involving inves-
tigative reports have been developed. 58 The majority rule was
established in Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plo-
vidba. 59 In Thomas, the defendant wanted the plaintiff to turn
over two documents that were relevant to his claim, 160 but the
plaintiff argued that the documents were privileged under the
work product doctrine. 1 1 The court held that a report or state-
ment made to a party's agent, which was not requested by or
prepared for an attorney, or which otherwise reflects an attor-
ney's legal expertise, is conclusively presumed to have been
made in the ordinary course of business. 162 Therefore, the court
concluded that such a report is not granted work product
protection. 163
The court based its opinion largely on policy reasons, find-
ing its decision consistent with the Federal Rules' underlying
153. See generally Cohn, supra note 148, at 925-29.
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See Robert D. Stokes, Discovering Investigative Reports Under the Work
Product Doctrine, 34 BAYLOR L. REV. 156 (1982).
158. See id. at 154-57.
159. 54 F.R.D. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1972). See also Stokes, supra note 157, at 161.
160. See Thomas, 54 F.R.D. at 368-69.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 372.
163. See id.
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policy of liberal discovery. 164 Further, the court reasoned that
any document prepared after an event which is likely to lead to
litigation is not deemed to be automatically prepared in antici-
pation of litigation, and is not within the purview of work-prod-
uct protection. 165 If such an approach were adopted, then
nothing created for an insurance company would ever be discov-
erable, because an insurance company only investigates situa-
tions after an event has occurred. 66 Courts wishing to adhere
to the goal of providing liberal discovery have thus construed
Federal Rule 26(b)(3) very narrowly. 167
The second line of cases evolved out of Almaguer v. Chi-
cago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad Co.168 In Almaguer, the
plaintiff sustained injuries in an accident while working for the
defendant. 69 The accident was witnessed by one person, whose
written statement was obtained by the defendant's claim agent
as part of the investigation, before the plaintiff retained coun-
sel.170 The court held that the witness' statement was prepared
in anticipation of litigation,'7 ' reasoning that statements taken
by a claim agent immediately after an accident are taken in an-
ticipation of litigation. 7 2 The policies supporting this rule in-
clude: protecting the litigant's evaluation of his case;
encouraging independent preparation for trial; and preventing
one side from gaining automatic access to the preparatory work
of the other side. 7 3 Further, the Almaguer court noted that the
expectation of litigation in this circumstance was reasonable
and supported the conclusion that the document was prepared
in anticipation of litigation. 7 4
The third approach is a hybrid of the Thomas rule and the
Almaguer rule, and was articulated in Hercules Inc v. Exxon
Corp. 175 In Hercules, the court described the anticipation of liti-
164. See id. at 373.
165. See Thomas, 54 F.R.D. at 373.
166. See id.
167. See Stokes, supra note 157, at 160-61.
168. 55 F.R.D. 147 (D. Neb. 1972).
169. See id. at 148.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See Stokes, supra note 157, at 161-62.
174. See Almaguer, 55 F.R.D. at 149.
175. 434 F. Supp. 136 (D. Del. 1977).
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gation test as whether, in light of the nature of the documents
and the factual situation in the particular case, the document
can be fairly said to have been prepared or obtained in anticipa-
tion of litigation. 176 This approach requires the court to balance
the liberal policy of the federal rules against the need to protect
an attorney's preparation of his or her case. 177 It allows protec-
tion for an attorney who reasonably anticipates litigation based
on some action of his or her client, but does not allow a blanket
protection when the possibility of litigation is too remote. 78
4. Common-law Tests to Determine Whether a Document
was Created in the Anticipation of Litigation
a. Specific Claim Requirement
There are several situations where the distinction between
a document prepared in the ordinary course of business and one
prepared in anticipation of litigation becomes confused. For ex-
ample, in SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 79 plaintiffs, pursuant to
antitrust litigation, sought a memoranda prepared by attorneys
in the Xerox patent department. 180 The memoranda contained
public information, brief descriptions of patents, and legal opin-
ions regarding patent applicability.'18 The court held that the
documents were not sufficiently connected to the litigation to
merit protection since no specific claim against the company
was present at the time of preparation. 8 2 The court went on to
state that "legal departments are not citadels in which public,
business, or technical information may be placed to defeat dis-
176. See id. at 151. This test is essentially the same test articulated by
CharlesWright and Arthur Miller:
Prudent parties anticipate litigation, and begin preparation prior to the
time suit is formally commenced. Thus the test should be whether, in light
of the nature of the document and the factual situation in the particular
case, the document can be fairly said to have been prepared or obtained be-
cause of the prospect of litigation.
8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
2024, at 343 (2d ed. 1994).
177. See Hercules, 434 F. Supp. at 150.
178. See infra, note 184 and accompanying text.
179. 70 F.R.D. 508 (D. Conn. 1976).
180. See id. at 515.
181. See id.
182. See id.
1998]
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covery and thereby ensure confidentiality." 18 3 Thus, the specific
claim requirement prevents a company from protecting any doc-
ument it so desires by merely involving a lawyer in the produc-
tion of the document.'84
In National Union Fire Ins. v. Murray Sheet Metal,'85 a case
involving investigative documents, the Fourth Circuit adopted
the specific claim requirement as set forth in Hercules.8 6 In
National Union, an in-house investigation was conducted fol-
lowing a fire which later became the subject of an insurance dis-
pute.18 7 The court provided some guidelines for analyzing work
product application in this situation, stating that the critical
factor is the driving force behind the creation of the requested
document. 88 The court stated that "[tihe document must be
prepared because of the prospect of litigation when the preparer
faces an actual or potential claim following an actual event or
series of events that reasonably could result in litigation." 18 9
The court then pointed out two factors which weighed against
finding the documents were prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion. 90 First, the documents were created by persons in charge
of safety in the workplace, thus calling into question whether
183. Id.
184. See United States v. Jordan, 591 F.2d 753, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (finding
that the work-product doctrine does not extend to every document created by an
attorney, but is limited to materials prepared in the anticipation of litigation); Her-
cules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F.Supp. 136, 151 (D. Del. 1977) (holding that work-
product is restricted to documents prepared in anticipation of litigation because an
attorney who does not envision litigation, except as a remote contingency, will not
anticipate requests for discovery, and therefore the fear of disclosure will not deter
adequate consideration of the client's problem); Coastal States Gas Corp. v. De-
partment of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 865 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (although every audit po-
tentially could lead to litigation, the possibility alone is not enough to support a
claim of work product protection); Fustok v. Conticommodity Serv. Inc., 106 F.R.D.
590, 591-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding that a report was not protected by the work-
product privilege because the prospect of litigation was not identifiable when the
report was written, since no specific claim had already arisen); Gould Inc. v. Mitsui
Mining & Smelting, 825 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that the application of the
work product doctrine depends upon the "existence of a real, rather than specula-
tive, concern that the thought processes of ... counsel in relation to pending or
anticipated litigation would be exposed").
185. 967 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1992).
186. See id. at 981.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 984.
189. Id.
190. See National Union, 967 F.2d at 985-86.
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these persons were preparing the documents in anticipation of
litigation. 191 Second, many documents were prepared by an em-
ployee before counsel was retained or before the insurance com-
pany was notified, casting doubt on the proposition that the
documents were prepared for litigation purposes. 192
b. Function of the Documents
Unlike Hercules and National Union, some courts do not
apply the specific claim requirement. 193 Instead, those courts
may apply a test which focuses on the function of the docu-
ments. 194 For example, in Delaney, Migdail & Young v. IRS, 95
the court found that policy reasons justified applying the func-
tion of the documents test in lieu of the specific claim require-
ment. 196 In Delaney, the plaintiffs, pursuant to the Freedom of
Information Act, sought production of two memoranda analyz-
ing the legal ramifications of a new system of statistical sam-
pling, adopted by the IRS, to be used for auditing large
accounts. 97 The plaintiff claimed that the documents were not
prepared in anticipation of litigation because the agency had
not demonstrated that a specific claim had arisen. 98 The func-
tion of the documents was to advise the agency of the types of
challenges likely to be brought against it, the agency's potential
defenses, and the likely outcome. 99 Utilizing policy arguments
from Hickman, the court stated that the plaintiffs were only try-
ing to obtain the documents to gain the agency attorneys' as-
sessment of the program's legal vulnerabilities in order to make
sure that it did not miss anything in crafting its legal cases
against the program. 200 The court ultimately held that the doc-
uments were entitled to work product protection. 20' The Dela-
ney court explicitly declined to follow the specific claim
requirement, because it would ignore the function performed by
191. See id. at 984.
192. See id. at 986.
193. See Delaney, Migdail & Young v. IRS, 826 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
194. See id. at 127.
195. 826 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
196. See id. at 126-27.
197. See id. at 125-26.
198. See id. at 126-27.
199. See id. at 127.
200. See Delaney, 826 F.2d at 127.
201. See id.
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the withheld material and would conflict with well established
rules of discovery. 20 2
c. Primary Motivation Standard
The final consideration for determining whether a docu-
ment was created in anticipation of litigation is the primary mo-
tivation, or purpose, for creating the document.2 3 The primary
motivation standard has been described as follows:
preparation was primarily motivated by the prospect of litigation
... but not material prepared for other legal eventualities or for
business purposes. The standard in this Section looks to the rea-
sonable anticipation of the lawyer who prepared the material at
the time it was prepared. The fact that anticipated litigation did
not in fact ensue does not destroy the work product status of ma-
terial .... [Tihe immunity covers only material produced with
litigation as the primary object of attention. Whether such was
the motivation is determined by considering the factual context in
which materials are prepared, the nature of the materials, and
the expected role of the lawyer, if any, in ensuing litigation.20 4
The primary motivation standard was applied in In re Les-
lie Fay Companies Securities Litigation.20 5 In Leslie Fay, a class
action suit brought by shareholders pursuant to findings of ac-
counting irregularities in the company's financial statements,20 6
the court held that materials generated while investigating
complaints of fraud, in connection with the issuance of securi-
ties, were not entitled to work product protection.20 7 The court
reasoned that even though litigation could reasonably be antici-
pated under the circumstances, there was an insufficient show-
202. See id.
203. See Soeder v. General Dynamics Corp., 90 F.R.D. 253, 255 (D. Nev. 1980)
(finding that the primary motivation was not to prepare for litigation, but to im-
prove the product, guard against adverse publicity, and protect the company's eco-
nomic interests); National Union, 967 F.2d at 984 (finding that the critical factor is
the driving force behind the preparation of each requested document); El Paso, 682
F.2d at 543-44 (finding that primary motivation was "to anticipate, for financial
reporting purposes, what the impact of litigation might be on the company's tax
liability").
204. RESTATEMENT (THiRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAwYERS § 136(k) (Tentative
Draft No. 6, 1993).
205. 161 F.R.D. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
206. See id. at 277.
207. See id. at 280.
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ing that the documents were created in anticipation of
litigation. 208 Rather, the primary motivation for the investiga-
tion was business related, 20 9 so the documents were not
shielded by work product protection. 210
The court based its determination of the primary motiva-
tion upon the circumstances surrounding the creation of the
documents. 21' The Audit Committee used the investigation and
report to decide who to fire, to determine the magnitude of the
fraud, to re-organize new organization and financial structure,
and to reassure creditors and future lenders that the responsi-
ble parties and problematic policies were being removed.21 2 The
court stressed the importance of looking at the overall circum-
stances to determine what is really going on,21 3 pointing out
that the company would have conducted the investigation even
if there had been no litigation.21 4
One resounding principle emerges from close examination
of the various tests and types of documents being analyzed: the
crucial factor in determining whether work product protection
applies is the circumstances, in their entirety, under which the
protection is being claimed. 215 Labeling a document as either a
"business" document or an "investigative" document adds no
clarity to the issue. In fact, practically any document before a
court could easily be placed into either category. 216 Once a court
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See Leslie Fay, 161 F.R.D. at 280.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 280-81.
213. See id. at 281.
214. See id.
215. See generally id. at 280 ("reasonableness" in relation to the anticipation
of litigation requirement focuses on the temporal limits of the doctrine's applica-
tion based on the circumstances surrounding the case); Delaney, Migdail & Young
v. IRS, 826 F.2d 124, 126-27 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (looking beyond the law firm's argu-
ment that there was no specific claim when the document was prepared by the IRS
to the fact that the law firm was merely attempting to "borrow the wits" of the IRS
attorneys); National Union Fire Insurance v. Murray Sheet Metal, 967 F.2d 980,
984 (4th Cir. 1992) (weighing all of the facts in order to reach a conclusion on
whether work product protection applied).
216. See, e.g., National Union, 967 F.2d 980, 984. Arguments supporting
either type of document could be made in regard to the investigative report in issue
in National Union. See id. at 981. It could be argued that since the document was
created, following a fire, in order to investigate the cause of the fire, the document
was an investigative document. See id. at 984. However, it could also be argued
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attempts to provide rigid rules in applying the work product
doctrine, it loses sight of the importance of looking to the cir-
cumstances in which it was created.217 This was the error the
district court made in the Adiman I decision. 218 The court tried
to develop a concrete rule to apply in all situations, which is not
practical in the context of work product doctrine. 21 9 The Court
of Appeals was correct in reversing the district court's develop-
ment of the rule. 220
III. Lead Case: United States v. Adlman 1221
A. Facts
The action was brought by the United States to enforce an
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) summons issued to Monroe
Adlman.222 Adlman was an in-house attorney and Vice Presi-
dent of Taxes for Sequa Corporation. 223 The summons was for
production of a preliminary and final draft of a memorandum
prepared by Sequa's auditors, Arthur Andersen & Co. pursuant
to Adlman's request.224 Adlman refused to turn over the docu-
ments, claiming they were protected by the attorney-client priv-
ilege and work-product doctrine. 225
Adlman requested the memorandum in order to determine
the likely tax consequences of a plan to combine two subsidiary
corporations owned by Sequa. 226 The memorandum was written
by an accountant and partner at Arthur Andersen who special-
that since the company policy was to undergo such an investigation whenever
there was any kind of accident, including a fire, the document was created in the
ordinary course of business. See id. Further, if the document had been created by
someone in the industry of investigating claims based on accidents, such as an
insurance claims agent, it could be argued the investigation was in the ordinary
course of business for the claims agent. See id.
217. See infra notes 268-271 and accompanying text. The AdIman court
points out two instances where the rigid rule established by the district court
would be incorrect in its application.
218. See infra notes 371-389 and accompanying text.
219. See infra notes 371-389 and accompanying text.
220. See infra notes 371-389 and accompanying text.
221. 68 F.3d 1495 (2d Cir. 1995).
222. See id. at 1496.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See id.
226. See Adiman I, 68 F.3d at 1497.
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol18/iss2/5
CLIENT CONFIDENCES
ized in evaluating the tax implications of corporate restructur-
ing.227 Following the creation of the memorandum, the
restructuring took place according to Arthur Andersen's sugges-
tions.228 Because of the reorganization, Sequa stood to receive a
large tax refund.229 The IRS audited Sequa's tax returns from
1986 through 1989.230 Pursuant to the audit, the IRS requested
the memorandum prepared by Arthur Andersen, which Sequa
refused on the grounds that the information was protected by
the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine. 231
B. Procedural History
1. District Court
The district court held that the documents were not pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege because the objective evi-
dence surrounding the communication did not suggest that the
attorney-client privilege was invoked. 232 Namely, there was no
evidence to distinguish Arthur Andersen's work on this particu-
lar occasion from any of the other work Arthur Andersen per-
formed for Sequa.233 The court also held that the documents
were not protected by the work product doctrine and ordered
disclosure of the document to the IRS, based on the fact that the
document was prepared before the transaction took place. 234
Thus, the court articulated the rule that the possibility of litiga-
tion based on an event which has not yet occurred is not enough
to justify work product protection.235
C. The Parties' Arguments
Adlman argued that the attorney-client privilege applied to
the consultation and that the help he received from Arthur An-
dersen was within the attorney-client privilege under Kovel,
since the help was rendered to assist Adlman in giving advice to
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See id. at 1498.
231. See Adiman I, 68 F.3d at 1498.
232. See id. at 1499.
233. See id.
234. See id.
235. See id.
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his client.236 In support of his claim, Adlman noted that one of
his duties was to advise Sequa's management of the conse-
quences of a particular transaction under the tax laws. 237 How-
ever, due to his lack of expertise in the corporate reorganization
provisions of the tax code, he was forced to seek the help of the
Arthur Andersen accountant to interpret the provisions for
him.238 Adlman claimed he was acting in his capacity as a law-
yer advising the corporation when he had the document pre-
pared, and it was clear to both himself and Arthur Andersen
that the memorandum was private and confidential. 239 Adlman
further stated that after reading the final Arthur Andersen
memorandum, he was able to draw his own conclusions regard-
ing the tax consequences of the restructuring, and advised Se-
qua accordingly. 240
Addressing the work product claim, AdIman also argued
that he was certain that Sequa would "end up in litigation with
the IRS" over the reorganization. 241 This belief was based on
the following: the IRS audited Sequa every year, so this trans-
action would not escape their attention; the large amount of the
claimed tax loss would require review by the Congressional
Joint Committee on Taxation; and, there was no case or ruling
directly on point.242
The government claimed that Arthur Andersen was a tax
and business advisor to Sequa's management. 243 The memoran-
dum was tax advice given to Sequa as part of Arthur Andersen's
larger role as consultant to Sequa's management, and not sim-
ply advice as an accountant assisting an attorney in rendering
legal advice. 244 The government also introduced evidence that
Arthur Andersen's services in connection with the memoran-
dum were not billed separately from any of the other services
Arthur Andersen performed for Sequa's management. 245 Thus,
236. See AdIman 1, 68 F.3d at 1498.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See id.
240. See id.
241. Adlman 1, 68 F.3d at 1498.
242. See id.
243. See id. at 1499.
244. See id.
245. See id.
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this service was not provided to aid Adlman in advising his cli-
ent, but was provided directly to the management as an ac-
counting service, which is not entitled to receive work product
protection. 246
D. The Court's Analysis
1. Attorney-Client Privilege
Adlman claimed that the advice he received from Arthur
Andersen met the criteria in Kovel, thus establishing that the
communication was protected by the attorney-client privi-
lege. 247 In Kovel, the court held that the attorney-client privi-
lege would extend to communications by an attorney's client to
an accountant hired by the attorney to assist the attorney in
understanding the client's financial information. 248 The Kovel
court stressed that vital to the privilege was that the communi-
cation be made in confidence for the purpose of obtaining legal
advice from the attorney.249 The Second Circuit in Adlman I
found that Adlman failed to meet his burden of establishing
that the facts were within the Kovel principle because the facts
were subject to competing interpretation and there was no rea-
son to upset the decision of the district court. 250 The principle
the court relied upon was that if Sequa provided information to
Arthur Andersen in order to seek their expert advice on the tax
implications of the proposed transaction, the attorney-client
privilege would not apply.251 The evidence supported the notion
that Arthur Andersen was not hired by Adlman, in his capacity
as attorney, to render legal advice, but that Arthur Andersen
was hired by Sequa for general tax advice. 25 2 This conclusion
was drawn largely because there was nothing to separate the
advice provided for Adlman from the advice given to Sequa as
part of Arthur Andersen's tax advisor role.253 There were no
separate billing statements and Arthur Andersen prepared the
246. See Adlman I, 68 F.3d at 1500.
247. See id.
248. See supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text; United States v. Kovel,
296 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1961).
250. See Adlman 1, 68 F.3d at 1500.
251. See id.
252. See id.
253. See id.
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memorandum analyzing the problem because Adlman lacked
the expertise to do so himself.25 4 Thus, both the lack of contem-
poraneous documentary proof supporting Adlman's position,
along with the presence of proof supporting the government's
position, was enough to defeat Adlman's claim that the commu-
nication was protected by the attorney-client privilege. 255
2. Work Product
The district court relied on two cases to hold that a docu-
ment, created before the event which gives rise to litigation,
cannot be created in anticipation of litigation and is therefore
not subject to the work product protection.25 6 The first case was
National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal.25 7
National Union held that the critical factor in determining
whether work product protection applied was the motivation be-
hind the preparation of each document. 258 The court further
stated that the "document must be prepared because of the
prospect of litigation when the preparer faces an actual claim or
a potential claim following an actual event or series of events
that reasonably could result in litigation."25 9 The Adlman I
court distinguished the National Union decision on the ground
that the National Union court was only stressing the causal re-
lationship between the anticipated litigation and the creation of
the document, but the court did not formulate a requirement
that the event leading to litigation had already occurred. 260
Further, the facts of National Union did not include a dispute
about the timing of the preparation of the document, because
the event, a fire, occurred before the document was prepared. 261
Thus, the court's statement was dictum. 262
254. See id.
255. See Adlman I, 68 F.3d at 1500 and n.1.
256. See id. at 1501-1502.
257. 967 F.2d 980 (4th Cir. 1992). See supra notes 185-192 and accompanying
text.
258. See National Union, 967 F.2d at 984.
259. Id.
260. See Adlman 1, 68 F.3d at 1501.
261. See id.
262. See id.
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The second case relied upon by the district court was SCM
Corp. v. Xerox Corp.263 SCM held that the critical factor in find-
ing that a document was prepared in anticipation of litigation is
that there must be a specific claim which makes the prospect of
litigation identifiable. 264 The Adlman I court distinguished
SCM because the specific claim requirement only stressed the
need for a specific claim, not a requirement that the actionable
facts have already occurred. 265
Moreover, the Adiman I court emphasized that there is no
rule that a document must be prepared following the actionable
event in order to merit work product protection, and the court
saw no reason to create one.266 The court illustrated its point by
noting that if a party decides to trade under a disputed trade-
mark, or publishes a book with a contested copyright, the party
may very well expect to be sued, even though the event has not
yet occurred that would give rise to the litigation. 267 The event
in these situations is either the actual trade of the trademark or
the publication of the book.268 According to the court, there is
no reason to deny work-product protection in this situation to
any document created before such events if the document was
created to prepare for litigation.269 These examples represent
situations which would constitute reasonable, prudent action on
the part of the attorney, worthy of work product protection as
articulated in the Wright and Miller test.270
E. Subsequent History
1. The District Court on Remand271
The district court, on remand, held that the memorandum
was not work product based on its finding that Sequa's primary
purpose in creating the document was to determine whether or
263. 70 F.R.D. 508 (D. Conn. 1976).
264. See id. at 515.
265. See Adlman I, 68 F.3d at 1501-1502.
266. See id. at 1501.
267. See id.
268. See id.
269. See id.
270. See Adlman I, 68 F.3d at 1501. See also supra note 176 and accompany-
ing text.
271. United States v. Adlman, 79 A.F.T.R.2d 97-1946 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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not it should go through with a multi-million dollar deal.272 It
therefore could not be found that the document was created
principally or exclusively in the anticipation of litigation. 273
2. The Second Appeal to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals [Adlman 11]274
The remanded decision was appealed to the Second Circuit
to determine "whether a study prepared for an attorney assess-
ing the likely result of an expected litigation is ineligible for pro-
tection under . . . Rule [26(b)(3)] if the primary or ultimate
purpose of making the study was to assess the desirability of a
business transaction, which, if undertaken, would give rise to
the litigation."275 To answer this question, the Second Circuit
was required to interpret, for the first time, the anticipation of
litigation requirement in Rule 26(b)(3). 276 The court ultimately
adopted a two part test, holding that a document falls within
Rule 26(b)(3) protection when it "was created because of antici-
pated litigation, and would not have been prepared in substan-
tially similar form but for the prospect of that litigation."277
The court considered two alternative interpretations of the
anticipation of litigation requirement to reach its conclusion. 278
The first interpretation focuses on whether the documents were
prepared "primarily or exclusively to assist in litigation."279 The
second interpretation, formulated by Wright and Miller, focuses
on "whether the documents were prepared 'because of existing
or expected litigation."28 0 The court ultimately adopted the "be-
cause of' test.28 1
The court rejected the primarily to assist in litigation stan-
dard as inconsistent "with the text and policies of . . . Rule
[26(b)(3)]."282 Citing to the text of Rule 26(b)(3), the court noted
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. United States v. AdIman, No. 96-6095, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 2633 (2d
Cir. Feb. 13, 1998).
275. Id. at *2.
276. See id. at *8.
277. Id. at *2.
278. Id. at *12.
279. See AdIman H, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 2633, at *12.
280. Id. See also supra note 176 and accompanying text.
281. See id. at *13.
282. See id. at *15.
[Vol. 18:419
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol18/iss2/5
CLIENT CONFIDENCES
that the rule expressly provides protection to "documents 'pre-
pared... for trial"' and to documents "prepared 'in anticipation
of litigation."' 28 3 This language demonstrates that Rule 26(b)(3)
was not intended to provide protection only to documents cre-
ated to assist in preparation for litigation, because the language
"prepared for trial" would adequately protect these docu-
ments. 284 The inclusion of "in anticipation of litigation" indi-
cates that the drafters intended to provide protection beyond
just documents created "primarily to assist in litigation."28 5
The court also found that the policy rationale behind Rule
26(b)(3) would be undermined by the use of the primarily to as-
sist in litigation standard.28 6 In support of this conclusion, the
court first noted that when a court orders production of a docu-
ment based upon an adverse party's showing of substantial
need, Rule 26(b)(3) mandates that "the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opin-
ions, or legal theories of... [a party or representative] concern-
ing the litigation."28 7 Second, the Advisory Committee notes to
Rule 26(b)(3) state that "each side's informal evaluation of its
case should be protected, that each side should be encouraged to
prepare independently, and that one side should not automati-
cally have the benefit of the detailed preparatory work of the
other side."28 8 Based on the textual references to the Rule and
the Advisory Committee notes, the court stated that a blanket
exclusion of documents created to assist in making a business
decision from work product protection would cripple the policy
underlying the rule.28 9
The court also noted that the primarily to assist in litiga-
tion standard places companies in a precarious situation,290 be-
cause if the company wants to protect its litigation prospects by
using less candor or by making the document less complete, it
subjects itself to uninformed decision making.291 Conversely,
283. Id.
284. See Adlman H, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 2633, at *15.
285. See id. at *15-16.
286. See id. at *17-18.
287. Id. at *16 (quoting FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(3)).
288. Id. at *16 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) Advisory Committee's notes).
289. See AdIman H, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 2633, at *16-22.
290. See id. at *21.
291. See id.
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forcing production of a document that thoroughly addresses the
company's litigation strategies, including the strengths and
weaknesses of its case, would be highly prejudicial to the com-
pany's litigation prospects. 292
Finally, the court addressed language found in Rule
26(b)(3) which favors the primarily to assist in litigation stan-
dard.293 For example, the caption to Rule 26(b)(3) reads "trial
preparation," and the Advisory Committee notes refer to "trial
preparation materials" when discussing work product protec-
tion.294 The court summarily rejected the argument that these
references were persuasive evidence that the primarily to assist
in litigation standard was the better interpretation of rule
26(b)(3). 295 The court "attach[ed] small importance to these ref-
erences," given that the express text of the Rule and commen-
tary also refers to documents prepared "in anticipation of
litigation. ,296
Turning to the Second Circuit decision in Adlman II, the
court could not determine which test the district court applied
on remand. Therefore, the court vacated the district court's de-
cision and remanded for the district court to apply the "because
of' test.297 Thus, that if the district court finds that "substan-
tially the same" memorandum would have been prepared in any
event, in the "ordinary course of business" of undertaking the
restructuring, then the "because of' test was not met because
the memorandum was not prepared "because of' the expected
litigation. 298 If however, the district "court finds the memoran-
dum would not have been prepared but for" the corporation's
anticipation of litigation with the IRS, then the "because of' test
was met.
29 9
292. See id.
293. See id. at *17.
294. See Adlman H, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 2633, at *17.
295. See id.
296. See id.
297. See id. at *31-33.
298. See id. at *32-33.
299. See Adlman H, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 2633, at *33.
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IV. Analysis
A. Attorney-Client Privilege
Corporations as taxpayers often require the assistance of
in-house counsel as well as outside advice, due to the complex-
ity of the tax laws and the fact that penalties can be assessed if
income tax returns are completed incorrectly.300 In order to ob-
tain such assistance from an outside source, such as an account-
ant, information about the company's financial situation must
be related to the accountant.30' Further, any memoranda, as-
sessments, and opinions rendered by the accountant may assess
a variety of positions a corporation can take on a tax return,
which if turned over to the IRS during discovery, will point out
to the IRS the problems with the tax return and increase expo-
sure to liability.30 2 Thus, it is clear why corporations want to
increase the expanse of the attorney-client privilege for commu-
nications made to accountants and advice rendered by the ac-
countants. 30 3 On the other hand, granting too much of an
attorney-client privilege will build a zone of silence around cor-
porate affairs that will shield too much information from the
government, thereby granting corporations license to side step
tax laws. 30 4
The Adlman I decision represents a sound weighing of
these competing policies, and also accurately reflects the evolu-
tion the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context. In
fact, Adlman I adds a level of clarity to the law by providing
guidelines for when the attorney-client privilege is properly ap-
plied to accountant-client communications in the corporate
setting.
300. See Friedman, supra note 23, at 155. See also 26 U.S.C. §§ 6651-6724,
7201-7344 (1996).
301. See supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
302. See supra note 62.
303. See supra note 62.
304. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
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1. Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege in the
Corporate Context
a. Accountant-Client Privilege
The Adlman I court did not deviate from the rule of law
stated in Couch and affirmed in Young that there is no account-
ant-client privilege.305 In spite of arguments to the contrary,
the Adlman I court was correct in rejecting an accountant-client
privilege. Several arguments have been voiced throughout the
corporate community in favor of an accountant-client privi-
lege.306 Arguments in favor of an accountant-client privilege
consist of conserving resources, preserving the client's choice of
tax adviser, the fact that some states allow an accountant-client
privilege, and the fact that CPAs and other enrolled agents rep-
resent taxpayers before the IRS in the same manner as lawyers
under rules for administration of practice before the IRS.30 7
These arguments are not persuasive. A corporation may con-
serve some resources if there was an accountant-client privi-
lege. In practical terms, however, a corporation like Sequa,
with in-house attorneys, is going to utilize these attorneys for
all of its legal problems. That is their role within the corporate
entity. If an accountant is also needed, that will not alter the
fact that the corporation will have already called upon its own
attorney for advice on such a matter. This argument can really
only apply to small corporations who lack in-house counsel.
Notwithstanding the fact that a small corporation may not
have in-house counsel, it is still prudent business practice and
in the best interests of the corporation to hire an attorney in
addition to an accountant. An accountant lacks knowledge in
many areas of the law, such as procedural issues, which would
require an attorney's services. Finally, the help needed from an
accountant may not merit protection, even if an attorney is in-
volved. For example, if the accountant is helping an attorney
prepare the corporation's tax return, the information relayed
will not be protected by the attorney-client privilege, for tax re-
305. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
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turn preparation is considered business advice, not legal
advice. 308
For similar reasons, the limitations on a corporation's
choice of adviser will not be extensive due to the fact that a cor-
poration like Sequa has in-house counsel. Even in situations
requiring the services of an accountant, the attorney will be in-
volved. If communications in such a situation would merit pro-
tection if communicated to the attorney, then it is not difficult
for the attorney to take appropriate steps to insure that the
communications to the accountant are also protected. If what is
being sought is accounting services, then the communications
simply do not merit protection.
In addition, the fact that some states recognize an account-
ant-client privilege is not a sufficient reason for recognizing the
privilege at the federal level. Corporations, especially ones with
in-house counsel, are sophisticated entities, who should be
aware of the differences in the law between the state and fed-
eral level. The fact that accountants are allowed to represent
clients as attorneys before the IRS may give a client the impres-
sion that the attorney-client privilege would apply in this situa-
tion. This could be a problem for a person unfamiliar with the
legal system. Here, however, the corporation is a sophisticated
entity, which should be aware that communications to an ac-
countant would not be privileged. Further, the Court's reason-
ing in Couch is applicable to this situation, where the Court
stated that the accountant-client privilege was not of such a na-
ture as to create an expectation of privacy in the client.30 9
The arguments against the imposition of an accountant-cli-
ent privilege substantially outweigh those favoring the account-
ant-client privilege. First, under evidentiary principles,
testimonial privileges are only tolerable when they are designed
to protect weighty and legitimate competing interests.310 This
is based on the notion that the use of the privilege serves as an
"obstacle to the administration of justice"311 because it prevents
the use of highly relevant evidence. This argument certainly ap-
plies to the Adiman I decision. In Adiman I, the IRS sought the
308. See WIGMORE, supra note 7, at § 2192, at 73.
309. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
19981 457
39
PACE LAW REVIEW
memoranda drawn up by Arthur Andersen in an effort to ex-
plain the tax consequences of proposed corporate restructur-
ing.312 The restructuring occurred as recommended by Arthur
Andersen, thus the tax consequences analyzed in the Arthur
Andersen memoranda were highly relevant to what Sequa
claimed on its tax returns for the years during the restructur-
ing.313 By refusing to turn over the memoranda, Sequa was
withholding highly relevant information from the government,
frustrating the purpose of the broad discovery and evidentiary
principles.
Second, the role of an attorney and an accountant are dif-
ferent.314 This difference forms the foundation for allowing an
attorney-client privilege, while refusing an accountant-client
privilege. 315 An attorney's role is to be a confidential advisor,
owing a duty of undivided loyalty to his or her client. 31 6 The
attorney-client privilege is instrumental in building and main-
taining this kind of relationship between an attorney and his or
her client because it provides the client with the assurance that
information revealed to the attorney will not be repeated by the
attorney without the client's consent.31 7 An accountant, on the
other hand, does not simply owe a duty of loyalty to the client,
but also to the government agencies regulating the client's in-
dustry, the client's creditors, and the client's investors. 318 In
Couch, the Court rejected outright the assertion that a client's
records were entitled to protection based on the client's claim of
reliance on the confidential nature of the accountant-client rela-
tionship and the client's resulting expectation of privacy.31 9 The
Court stated that "there can be little expectation of privacy
where records are handed to an accountant, knowing that
mandatory disclosure of much of the information therein is re-
quired in an income tax return."320 Further, the fact that the
accountant can be criminally prosecuted for preparing a false
312. See United States v. Aldman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1496 (2d Cir. 1995).
313. See id. at 1497.
314. See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335-36 (1973).
315. See id.
316. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
317. See generally, supra note 31 and accompanying text.
318. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
319. See Couch, 409 U.S. at 335.
320. Id. at 335-36.
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return, highly encouraging the accountant to disclose any infor-
mation given to him or her by the client, precludes a client from
claiming that he or she had an expectation of privacy or confi-
dentiality.321 In addition, the role of an accountant is to give
information to the public about the client's financial state-
ments, not to serve as a confidential advisor to the client. 322
Adlman I serves as an example of a corporation attempting
to protect its communications made to an accountant. While
Sequa claimed that its accountant, Arthur Andersen, was hired
to assist Adlman in rendering legal advice, the facts establish
that Arthur Andersen was hired to provide tax advice to the
corporation directly.323 Because Adlman also happened to be an
attorney, the corporation tried to cloak the information Arthur
Andersen had in the form of the attorney-client privilege.324 In
reality, however, this case is very similar to Couch in that a
client was attempting to conceal information given to its ac-
countant from the IRS. But under the reasoning of Couch,
there is no reasonable expectation of privacy or confidentiality
between an accountant and client.325 Thus, the Adlman court's
decision regarding the attorney-client privilege was consistent
with the case law regarding communications between account-
ants and clients.
b. Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to an
Accountant as an Agent of the Attorney
Following the Upjohn decision, whether the attorney-client
privilege applies in the corporate context is determined on a
case-by-case basis. 326 The burden of proof is on the party assert-
ing the attorney-client privilege. 327 Thus, the Adlman I decision
was analyzed in light of its facts with the burden of proof placed
on Sequa.328 However, Upjohn gave no clear guidelines for
lower federal courts to determine when the attorney-client priv-
321. See id.
322. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
323. See United States v. AdIman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1500 (2d Cir. 1995).
324. See generally supra notes 224-227 and accompanying text.
325. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text.
326. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
327. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
328. See Adlman, 68 F.3d at 1499-1500.
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ilege applies in the corporate context.329 The Kovel case estab-
lished the elements Sequa had to show in order for the attorney-
client privilege to apply: a confidential communication, made to
obtain legal advice, from a lawyer.330 However, applying the
Kovel test and subsequent case law to Adiman I, the facts of
Adiman I fall far short of justifying the application of the attor-
ney-client privilege to the memoranda prepared by Arthur
Andersen.
Under Kovel, Sequa needed to establish that there was a
confidential communication to obtain legal advice from a law-
yer.331 In Adiman I, information pertaining to the corporation's
decision to reorganize, as well as corporate financial informa-
tion, was given to Arthur Andersen to enable it to analyze Se-
qua's tax position in light of the tax code.332 To satisfy the Kovel
test, the information must have been rendered to increase
Adlman's understanding of the tax code so he could furnish
legal advice to Sequa.333 Otherwise, if Sequa was merely seek-
ing tax advice from Arthur Andersen, the advice sought would
be the accountant's, not the attorney's, and the privilege would
not apply.334 The facts in Adlman I establish that the informa-
tion was being used as accounting advice by Sequa, not that
Adlman was utilizing Arthur Andersen's expertise to help him
advise his client.335 First, Adlman was not only Sequa's attor-
ney, he was also Sequa's Vice President for Taxes. 336 This
meant that Adlman had business as well as legal roles within
the corporation. Any communications made under the business
role are not protected by the attorney-client privilege.337 Sec-
ond, Arthur Andersen was regularly employed by Sequa, the cli-
ent, for accounting services. 338  There was nothing to
distinguish this transaction from any other accounting work
329. See generally supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text. See also Weiss,
supra note 35 at 1182.
330. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
332. See Adlman 1, 68 F.3d at 1497.
333. See id. at 1500.
334. See id. at 1499-1500.
335. See id. at 1500.
336. See id.
337. See Adlman 1, 68 F.3d.at 1500.
338. See id.
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that Arthur Andersen performed for Sequa.339 Third, Arthur
Andersen also gave advising services to Sequa in connection
with the restructuring. 340 Namely, Arthur Andersen sent a
summary of its recommendations and conclusions directly to
Sequa management, not to Adlman for his analysis and use in
rendering legal advice. 341 Fourth, Adiman lacked the expertise
to analyze the tax implications of the restructuring, meaning
that Arthur Andersen had to perform this analysis.342 This
places the kind of advice Arthur Andersen rendered outside of
the realm of explaining or merely interpreting the tax code for
Adlman, into actually performing the analysis on behalf of Se-
qua. This also defeats the possibility of drawing an analogy to
the accounting advice rendered by Arthur Andersen and the in-
terpreter analogy given in Kovel.343 In order for the analogy to
apply, the accountant could only explain the tax code provi-
sions, and how certain facts fall within the tax code, not advise
the corporation as to how it should handle a particular situa-
tion. That is the role of the attorney if the attorney-client privi-
lege is going to be invoked. Thus, Adlman is consistent with
Kovel by failing to permit the use of the attorney-client privilege
to protect Arthur Andersen's memoranda.
c. In-House Counsel and the Attorney-Client
Privilege
A problem often arises when in-house corporate counsel as-
serts the attorney-client privilege. In order for advice given by
in-house counsel to be protected, it must be legal advice. 3 4
Often, in-house counsel has dual business and legal responsibil-
ities within a corporation, as in Adlman.345 Under Hardy, the
business aspects of a corporate decision based on both business
and legal decisions are not protected just because legal consid-
erations are also involved.346 Similarly, In re Sealed Case held
339. See id.
340. See id. at 1497.
341. See id.
342. See AdIman 1, 68 F.3d at 1498.
343. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
344. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
345. See Adlman 1, 68 F.3d at 1496.
346. See Hardy v. New York News, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 643-44 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
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that in order for advice rendered by an in-house attorney who
was also a company vice-president to be protected, there must
be a clear showing that the in-house attorney gave the advice in
a professional legal capacity. 347 Also, tax preparation and ac-
counting services are not considered legal advice. 348 It was as-
serted before the Court of Appeals in Adiman I that in-house
counsel was being held to a higher standard than outside coun-
sel, on the grounds that in-house counsel has to make a clear
showing that the advice was legal advice, that it was not ac-
counting service, and that the advice was not part of tax return
preparation.349 Outside counsel does not bear this elevated bur-
den because the dual role problem is lacking; it is much more
clear when outside counsel was hired for legal advice. 350 In ad-
dition, commentators of the Adiman I decision have determined
that the district court placed upon in-house counsel and corpo-
rations the requirement to separate transactions sought to be
privileged from other work accountants perform for the law
firm. 35 1 This issue was effectively handled in Adiman J.352 The
court explained that the district court's opinion did not require
separate retainer and billing arrangements in order to protect
the attorney-client privilege.3 53 Rather, the district court
merely examined the circumstances as a whole as required by
Upjohn and Kovel in order to determine whether the attorney-
client privilege was applicable. 354 Thus, the district court did
not place a requirement upon in-house counsel to obtain sepa-
rate retainer and billing arrangements in order to preserve the
attorney-client privilege.355
The claim that in-house counsel is held to a higher level of
scrutiny when the attorney-client privilege is asserted has
merit. However, this higher burden is necessary to preserve the
balance of competing policies courts have achieved. 35 6 The ad-
347. See In re Sealed Case, 737 F.2d 94, 99 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
348. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
349. See Ferguson, supra note 99 at 47.
350. See id.
351. See id.
352. See Adlman I, 68 F.3d at 1500, n.1.
353. See id.
354. See id.
355. See id.
356. See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
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ded requirement upon in-house counsel is that there must be a
clear showing that the advice rendered is legal advice. 357 No
such requirement is necessary for outside counsel because
outside counsel lacks business responsibilities within the corpo-
ration.358 If no such requirement were placed upon in-house
counsel, business advice would fall within the protection of the
attorney-client privilege. Thus, any activity performed by the
in-house attorney would be shielded. To build a wall of silence,
a corporation would merely have to funnel all documents, in-
cluding strictly business documents, through an in-house
attorney.
This would not comport with the policies underlying the at-
torney-client privilege.359 Since rendering business advice is
not part of an attorney's duty, such a practice does not preserve
the attorney's role as a confidential advisor.360 It does not en-
courage "full and frank communication" 361 between the attorney
and his or her client so that the attorney can provide adequate
representation, because the advice will usually have nothing to
do with litigation. There is also little risk that the corporate
client will avoid full disclosure out of fear that what is said is
business advice and unprotected by the attorney-client privi-
lege.362 This is so because the corporation is a sophisticated cli-
ent, and has probably been involved in litigation before.
Second, if a member of a corporation is asking for business ad-
vice, the attorney can so inform him or her and warn the person
that the advice will not be privileged. The Adiman I case makes
the delineation between business and legal advice clearer by
giving examples of acts indicative of privileged information. 363
The court's examples included: separating information re-
quested from an accountant to aid an attorney from the general
work that the accountant performs for the company in terms of
a separate billing statement and work agreement; having the
accountant communicate only with the attorney, and not di-
rectly to directors; and being able to make a showing that the
357. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
358. See Ferguson, supra note 99 at 47.
359. See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
360. See generally, Ferguson, supra note 99 at 47.
361. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
362. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
363. See supra note 254-257 and accompanying text.
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attorney reached his or her own legal conclusion based on the
information that the accountant provided. 364 Had the Adlman
court refused to require the distinction between business and
legal advice, it would have allowed too much protection for cor-
porations and would have been contrary to prior case law. This
would have actually made the law governing the application of
the attorney-client privilege in the corporate context unclear,
and would undermine the purpose of the attorney-client privi-
lege by reducing the certainty of the application of the privilege
in corporate situations.
B. Work Product Doctrine
1. Underlying Policies and Application of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3)
The policy decisions underlying work product doctrine were
developed in Hickman.365 As a limitation to the liberal policy of
the federal discovery rules, work product doctrine allows an at-
torney to plan for trial and prepare legal theories without inter-
ference from opposing counsel.366 It also aims at preventing one
attorney from borrowing the wits of his or her adversary
through discovery requests for documents prepared by opposing
counsel, for no better reason than to make sure that nothing
was missed in preparing for his or her own case.367 These poli-
cies were embodied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3),
which provides work product protection to a document or tangi-
ble thing otherwise discoverable, which was prepared in antici-
pation of litigation or for trial, and was prepared by or for
another party or by or for that other party's representative. 368
In Adlman I and Adlman II, Adlman claimed that the work
product doctrine applied to the memoranda prepared by Arthur
Andersen at Adlman's request. 369 The issue in Adlman I and
Adlman II arose with the second element, whether the docu-
ment was prepared in the anticipation of litigation.370 Upon ex-
364. See supra note 254-257 and accompanying text.
365. See supra notes 121-125 and accompanying text.
366. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 123-124 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 130-133 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 242-244 and accompanying text.
370. See generally, supra notes 257-271 and accompanying text.
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amination of the two district court opinions, it is evident that
the district court was seeking bright line rules to guide other
courts and practitioners. In both appeals, the Court of Appeals
has appropriately rejected these bright line rules in favor of a
case-by-case approach which requires courts to carefully ex-
amine all of the facts and circumstances to determine whether
production of the documents comports with the policies of Rule
26(b)(3).
2. Anticipation of Litigation
a. The District Court's New Test
In its first decision, the district court formulated a new
bright line rule to apply when determining whether a document
was created in "anticipation of litigation."371 The district court
held that a document created before the event giving rise to liti-
gation could not be created in anticipation of litigation.37 2 The
Court of Appeals correctly overruled the application of this new
rule of law.
One source of divergence between the district court and the
Court of Appeals was each court's interpretation of the SCM
case.3 7 3 The difference of opinion involved the statement, "[a]
specific claim must have arisen to make the prospect of litiga-
tion identifiable in order for the work product rule to apply."374
The district court read this language as a requirement that the
event giving rise to the litigation must have occurred before the
document was prepared, while the Court of Appeals found that
the statement was only a reference to the requirement of a spe-
cific claim as opposed to a speculative claim. 375 The Court of
Appeals' interpretation more accurately comports with prece-
dent. As the Court of Appeals noted, no case law has ever re-
quired that the event occur before the document is created in
order for work product privilege to apply.3 7 6 The principle un-
derlying the Court of Appeals' holding is that a rigid rule which
applies to every fact situation cannot be used in work product
371. See supra notes 232-235 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 235-236 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 264-267 and accompanying text.
374. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 70 F.R.D. 508, 515 (D. Conn. 1976).
375. See supra notes 264-267 and accompanying text.
376. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
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doctrine. A heavily fact based and circumstance oriented in-
quiry to determine what was really going on at the time the doc-
ument(s) was created is required, namely, to determine
whether the attorney was actually preparing for litigation or
whether the attorney was attempting to avoid a discovery re-
quest. If a rigid rule is established whereby a given fact unre-
lated to the thinking or reasons behind the creation of the
document automatically places the document either within or
outside of work product protection, the anticipation of litigation
requirement has been effectively written out of the statute.
Each case requires its own fact specific inquiry, for there will
always be situations where a given set of circumstances, in con-
junction with certain facts, will merit work product protection,
whereas the same set of circumstances may not merit protection
based upon just a couple of varying facts. For example, the Sec-
ond Circuit in Adlman I noted that a document created before
the event which causes litigation could merit work product pro-
tection, as where a publisher publishes a book under a disputed
copyright.37 7 In this situation, the publisher can expect to be
sued, even though the event, the publication, has not yet oc-
curred. 378 Work product doctrine should shield any memoranda
prepared pursuant to this fact situation.379 If the district court's
test applied, however, the document would be summarily ex-
cluded because it was created before the event which caused the
litigation. This example demonstrates where the rigid rule
fails, for if universally applied, courts would ignore the purpose
for creating the document, which would render the anticipation
of litigation requirement meaningless. It would also punish
prudent parties for reasonable foresight, and may lead to other
problems, such as loss of evidence, fading memory, and wit-
nesses. Thus, the rigid rule adopted by the district court was
wisely expelled by the Court of Appeals.
377. See supra notes 268-270 and accompanying text.
378. See supra notes 268-270 and accompanying text. See also United States
v. Adlman, 68 F.3d 1495, 1501 (2d. Cir. 1995) ("there is no rule that bars applica-
tion of work product protection to documents created prior to the event giving rise
to litigation. Nor do we see any reason for such a limitation").
379. See Adlman I, 68 F.3d at 1501.
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b. The Court of Appeals Interpretation of the
Anticipation of Litigation Requirement
In Adlman II, the Second Circuit held that the language in
anticipation of litigation requires a showing that a document
was "created because of anticipated litigation, and would not
have been prepared in substantially similar form but for the
prospect of that litigation."380 By adopting the "because of' test
instead of the "primarily to assist in litigation" standard, the
Second Circuit has once again appropriately rejected a bright
line rule in favor of a fact and circumstance oriented solution
that allows the court to reach a conclusion based on the reality
of the situation.
Work product doctrine is a protection that must be care-
fully guarded to protect an attorney's legal product while also
adhering to the opposing policy of liberal discovery underlying
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 38' The ensuing struggle
between these competing policies has been compounded by the
search for bright lines to guide practitioners and their clients.
After all, this is an area where relative certainty is desireable
because the rule is intended to provide attorneys with a zone of
comfort in rendering legal advice. 3 2 To reach the conclusion
most consistent with the Rule's policy concerns, courts must
carefully evaluate all of the facts and circumstances of the case
to determine the reality of the situation.
The cases in this area, regardless of the interpretation of
the anticipation of litigation test being applied, illustrate that
the courts do in fact reach the conclusion that most effectively
perpetuates these policies. The courts then apply a rule that
allows them to reach that conclusion while also attempting to
provide a bright line to guide lower courts and practitioners.
For example, both the SCM and Gould courts used the specific
claim requirement to deny work product protection to the docu-
ments at issue. 383 Underlying each holding was the finding that
in reality, one side was attempting to stifle the free flow of infor-
mation. 3 4 However, applying the specific claim requirement in
380. Adiman II, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 2633 at *2.
381. See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 27-34 and accompanying text.
383. See supra notes 179-184 and accompanying text.
384. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
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the Delaney case would have required the production of docu-
ments that the court found contained legal theories and mental
impressions. 385
In Delaney, the plaintiffs filed a Freedom of Information re-
quest for memoranda, prepared by IRS attorneys, which ana-
lyzed the legal ramifications of a contemplated new auditing
system.38 6 The memoranda contained mental impressions and
legal theories of IRS attorneys, as they were written to advise
the agency of the types of challenges likely to be brought
against it, the potential defenses for the agency, and the likely
outcome of a challenge to a proposed auditing system.38 7 How-
ever, since the program was not in effect, and in fact had not
even been announced to the public at the time the memoranda
were created, the specific claim test was not met.38 8 Thus, if the
specific claim test were applied, the court would have had to
order the production of the memoranda. 38 9 Because the court
found that, in reality, the plaintiffs were seeking the documents
in order to gain the agency attorneys' assessment of the pro-
gram's legal vulnerabilities to make sure that they did not miss
anything in crafting their legal challenges to the program, pro-
duction would have been contrary to the rule's policies. 390 To
reach a conclusion consistent with this policy, the court applied
the function of the documents rule holding that work product
protection applied. 391
Similarly, as demonstrated in Adlman, the primarily to as-
sist in litigation standard cannot be universally applied to all
situations and reach a result consistent with work product pol-
icy principles. The primarily to assist in litigation standard is
another attempt to draw a bright line, because it requires auto-
matic denial of work product protection to documents created
for a business purpose. This is inappropriate as demonstrated
by the "publisher" example provided by the Second Circuit in
Adlman I and II, where a memorandum was prepared to ana-
lyze the ramifications of publishing a book even though the
385. See supra notes 196-202 and accompanying text.
386. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
387. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
388. See supra notes 201-202 and accompanying text.
389. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
390. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
391. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
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copyright was contested. 392 In this case, the memorandum was
created primarily for a business purpose, to determine whether
or not to go forward with publication even though the copyright
is contested.393 The document is also likely to contain an attor-
ney's mental impressions and legal analysis which should be af-
forded work product protection.394 Otherwise, opposing counsel
could benefit from the labor of the publisher's attorney by ob-
taining the document through discovery. This would conflict
with the policy of preventing one attorney from borrowing the
wits of his or her adversary, so a different rule would have to be
applied to reach the desired result.
The Adiman case involves the same problem. In Adiman,
the memoranda were prepared largely for a business purpose,
to determine whether to restructure based upon the tax ramifi-
cations of the restructuring and the fact that Sequa would be
audited by the IRS pursuant to the restructuring.395 According
to the court, simply because creation of the documents was mo-
tivated by a business purpose, it should not be automatically
excluded from work product protection. 396 Here, this business
decision was going to subject Sequa to litigation, and preparing
for that likelihood by analyzing the legal implications of the re-
structuring and the chances of success was prudent action by
the corporation and its attorney.
One issue raised by this analysis is the fear that corpora-
tions will be easily able to shield documents from discovery, pro-
viding them with a zone of secrecy. 397 The "because of test"
adopted by the Second Circuit adequately addresses this con-
cern by requiring a showing that the document would not have
been prepared in substantially similar form but for the prospect
of litigation. 398 In order to meet this element, a corporation will
have to make a substantial showing that the document was in
fact created because of the prospect of litigation.399 For exam-
ple, in Adiman, it will be extremely difficult for Sequa to demon-
392. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 267-268 and accompanying text.
394. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
395. See supra notes 227-230 and accompanying text.
396. See supra notes 256-270 and accompanying text.
397. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
398. See supra notes 297-299 and accompanying text.
399. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
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strate that it would not have prepared the memoranda in issue
if it had not been certain of an IRS audit. The memorandum
was created largely for business purposes, to analyze the poten-
tial tax ramifications of contemplated corporate restructuring,
and Sequa will be hard pressed to argue that it would not have
created such a document in the ordinary course of business.
V. Conclusion
The Adiman I decision resolved the issues of the applica-
tion of the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine
in the corporate context in a manner consistent with precedent.
The court's decision with regard to the attorney-client privilege
was important to protect the sanctity of the privilege and guard
against allowing corporations to shield much of their activity
from the reach of the courts. The court accomplished this by
refusing to apply the attorney-client privilege to communica-
tions made to an accountant, and clearly outside the scope of an
attorney providing advice to his client. The court reached this
outcome through three major steps. First, it refused to apply an
accountant-client privilege. Second, it recognized the appropri-
ate circumstances for finding that communications to an ac-
countant as an agent of the attorney should be protected. Third,
it clarified when the work produced by in-house counsel will be
protected by the attorney-client privilege. By adding certainty
to the application of the attorney-client privilege, the court en-
hanced its application in the corporate context because there
will be less concern over whether a particular communication is
protected or not. The court also kept the privilege from ex-
tending too far, thereby preventing corporations from having
too much secrecy.
Additionally, the court preserved the balance established
through the common law with regard to work product doctrine
in the corporate context. By striking down a rigid rule that a
document created before the event which caused the litigation
cannot be protected by the work product doctrine, the court pre-
served the case-by-case inquiry into the facts of each case, as
required by the anticipation of litigation element of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). The court also protected the
case-by-case inquiry by holding that the anticipation of litiga-
tion requirement is satisfied by showing that the document was
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created because of anticipated litigation, and would not have
been created in substantially the same form but for the prospect
of the litigation. In adopting the "because of test," the court re-
jected the primarily to assist in litigation standard which would
summarily exclude from work product protection any document
created for a business purpose. Since the issue is not black and
white one, but rather one which requires a careful inquiry into
the facts and circumstances surrounding the creation of the doc-
ument, the court wisely rejected the mechanical approach of-
fered by the primarily to assist in litigation standard.
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